- French Minister of foreign affairs Jean-Marc Ayrault promised last week to make efforts to prevent aggravated confrontation with Russia during the summit. What are your forecasts for the summit in Warsaw?
Alexander Grushko: Making forecasts is a thankless task. Judging by our perceptions and the analysis of the information that we have, no qualitatively new decisions are coming in Warsaw. I am talking about the overall philosophy of relations with Russia. As of today it is based on two premises. First - the need to strengthen defence with a view to deter Russia. Second - to keep the channels of political dialogue open.

- And how this deterrence is reflected?
AG: The summit will authorize the  final composition of NATO forces which was discussed at the June meeting of NATO Defense ministers, namely the deployment on a rotational basis of four battalions in Poland and three Baltic states. Apparently, NATO will continue with an increased frequency of exercises along our borders. The command and control systems will be improved, six integration units in Eastern Europe are being formed. NATO will continue implementing its plans to create a European segment of the US global missile defense system, one site in Romania with interceptor missiles has been recently declared operational, the construction of another one is to be completed by 2018 in Poland. I think that these measures will constitute the essence of decisions that may be adopted or finally approved in Warsaw.
Moreover, it is obvious that at the summit NATO will try to more clearly define a strategy for its southern periphery, determine ways of addressing risks stemming from instability in the Middle East and North Africa and its potential contribution to the fight against terrorism. It seems that now inside NATO the majority prevails who considers the alliance as "a training organization", which will be ready to assist with defense capacity building in the states in the "zone of turbulence". Today, NATO trains militaries in Jordan, Tunisia, Iraq. It is announced that the alliance would be ready to help with capacity-building in Libya.

- Returning to the question of NATO activities along the eastern borders. The plans of the alliance in the near future is to reinforce its naval presence in the Black Sea region. How would Moscow respond?
AG: The response will be clear. We will do everything to keep the balance of power in the region. This applies to air and naval components and all other necessary areas. We have always advocated for the Black Sea region to remain an area for cooperation. Last week a ministerial meeting of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation took place in Sochi. We would like the relations between countries in the region to be focused on economy, social issues, cultural cooperation and tourism. For many years we have been working on serious projects, in particular, on establishing a Black Sea ring highway. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was created in the region. A unique system of confidence-building measures at sea was functioning. In general, these are prerequisites to prevent the Black Sea from becoming an arena for confrontation in the future.
We are concerned about the presence of non-regional powers there, in particular, the US Navy which regularly enters the Black Sea. Such ships as Donald Cook are able to carry a few dozens of Tomahawks, high-precision cruise missiles and are also equipped with the Aegis missile defense system. We have repeatedly warned the US about the danger of such ships approaching the Russian shores. These steps are destabilizing, they are detrimental to the regional security and undermine strategic stability.

- Are you concerned about the NATO exercises?
AG: Of course, we are concerned.

- NATO officials repeatedly raise concerns about Russia's exercises, particularly snap exercises. How could you reassure NATO?
AG: Indeed, NATO officials have recently complained about our snap exercises. But we conduct them in full compliance with our international commitments. We act in a very transparent manner, we  report on a voluntary basis, including through the OSCE, about such exercises. Our Ministry of defense organizes briefings for military attachés.
I would like to underline the following. Each state has its own forms of organizing its military activities. For us, snap exercises which include the redeployment of a large number of personnel and equipment are the most effective way of maintaining defense capabilities. For example, there is such an indicator as the number of soldiers per kilometer along the border. Russia holds the 42nd position for such a criterion. At present we can not afford to have a three-million army to cover all strategic areas. That is why, for us, the mobility and prompt redeployment of troops is the optimal form of organizing military activities, including the educational process. I am convinced that NATO military staff understand this. And any politician who would look at the map would realize that we can not act otherwise, if we want to be a self-sufficient state in military terms. Therefore, we will continue conducting such exercises.
The main point is that all these maneuvers are carried out on the territory of Russia. In case of NATO exercises we see redeployment of large numbers of foreign military forces to other countries. The fact that today many states ask for the presence of foreign troops on their territory, shows that the European security is in crisis. For many years the withdrawal of foreign forces from one's territory was the best way to ensure security in Central Europe.

- In your opinion, what would be the results of such NATO policy?
AG: NATO measures at the eastern flank definitely aggravate the situation. In fact, through military means, i.e. the rotation of military troops and large-scale exercises we see attempts to create new dividing lines on the contitnent, preventing the implementation of of a "larger Europe" project and strengthening the dependence of European countries on the United States.  
As for Russia, we are offered a confrontational agenda that we are not interested in. NATO must understand that, from a military point of view, all these measures will have a counterproductive effect. It is clear to any sober-minded person that there will have to be a military response from our side. We will take all necessary measures to ensure our defense. Therefore, those countries that have declared themselves as 'frontline' states, might soon realize that those efforts allegedely aimed at improving their security in fact undermine it. NATO makes us consider these countries as the region which might concentrate significant military capabilities and thus create risks and dangers for Russia.

-  However, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly said that it is a response to the Russian policy and that now the ball is on Moscow's side. What  does NATO expect from us?
AG: If we follow recent NATO statements, everything is linked to the situation in Ukraine. First of all, it is about the implementation of the Minsk agreements. But this position is cunning. Somehow the implementation of the agreements is demanded from Russia, which is not a party to a conflict. At the same time there is no indication that NATO is seriously working with Kiev, which until now has been blocking the implementation of political package of the Minsk agreements, primarily related to the adoption of the amnesty law and the special status for Donbas, amendments to the Constitution, and the establishment of a direct dialogue with the authorities of Lugansk and Donetsk which is the key fundamental commitment of Kiev. Moreover, NATO assistance programs to Ukraine play into the hands of the "party of war" in Kiev, creating an illusion of a possibility to solve the conflict through military means. We are also concerned about the fact that Ukrainian military units trained  by NATO instructors are being redeployed to the line of contact.

- The conflict in the eastern Ukraine has been going on for more than two years. During this period NATO rhetoric has not changed at all, has it?
AG: It would be fair to say that the essence of statements has not changed, but the tonality has been adjusted. Today we are concerned about the fact that the policy chosen by NATO under the guise of the Ukrainian crisis has now taken the form of the military planning and it is very dangerous. Military planning directed against Russia will inevitably generate a hostile policy. NATO will have to explain to the public why the alliance is spending such resources on addressing "the threat from the east." It is clear that there is no such threat.
But we see that the Cold war stereotypes are still alive. In addition, we see new stories  constantly appearing. Recently, various solid think tanks published materials aiming to prove that in case of inaction Russian tanks would reach Tallinn and Riga within 30-60 hours. Policies and military planning can not be based on such apocalyptic scenarios that have nothing to do with the reality. All these show that NATO feels uncomfortable in the new security environment. It was created to counter the 'threat from the east' and now it artificially invents a big enemy and fights against it.
At the same time we see that all NATO military interventions after the end of the cold war led to the most serious consequences. First of all, the military campaign against the former Yugoslavia in 1999. Many NATO countries were involved in the Iraq operation. The latest example is the bombing of Libya in 2011. The current situation in North Africa and the challenges that Europe faces today, in particular the migration crisis, are largely a result of NATO actions. The alliance states are responsible for it individually and collectively.

-It is clear with the first "pillar" you've mentioned - the containment of Russia. What about the second one - the dialogue? Are you getting ready for the next NRC meeting? What questions do you prioritize?
AG: The NRC meeting is under preparation. At the last meeting on April 20, we discussed the whole range of issues that affect European security. Of course, these issues will remain in the spotlight. But, in fact, we have no positive agenda today: NATO suspended all practical cooperation with us. That significantly weakens such format as the NATO-Russia Council. For this reason, today we do not consider NATO as a partner in solving problems, which equally affect us and the Europeans. Therefore, we cooperate in other formats, including the Normandy Group and the International Syria Support Group, to settle crisis situations and address common challenges. I would say, we do it above the institutional dividing lines which the European Union and NATO tried to draw in relations with Russia. At the same time we see that practical security interests prevail, and the European countries realize that they will not succeed in solving key problems without cooperation with Russia.

- Earlier, Afghanistan was one of the areas for cooperation between Moscow and NATO. On what conditions NATO would be ready to resume practical cooperation? And what about Russia?
AG: We are not putting forward any conditions. We simply assume that by suspending cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan NATO has seriously aggravated the situation in the country. I would like to remind that the largest international anti-drug project was carried out within the NRC framework: we have jointly trained (mostly in our training centers) more than 4000 officers for the anti-drug services of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. We also trained Afghan technicians to maintain Soviet and Russian-made helicopters. These helicopters are the basic combat power of the Afghan Air Force. Without them the army will not be able to provide reliable control of the country's territory. These are not my estimates, but the assessments of American generals we were in touch with throughout this project. The suspended cooperation affects not only Afghanistan, it also worsens the security situation in Europe. Europeans suffer indeed from the flow of drugs and uncontrolled migration, including from Afghanistan.

- Dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft of Russia and NATO have recently become more frequent. While it goes without accidents, isn't it high time to develop additional confidence-building measures?
AG: Today we have a solid basis for bilateral agreements with NATO countries (on the prevention of unintended military incidents). They serve as sufficient instruments for preventing incidents. As for particular encounters that took place recently, Russia formulated proposals that clarify certain provisions of USSR-US bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (1972). Therefore the ball is on the side of the Americans. We are ready for a dialogue with individual NATO countries that are interested in the improvement of these bilateral arrangements.

- What were Russian proposals?
AG: I will not go into details, because it is a matter of discussions between the militaries. We are talking about the minimum permitted distances between ships and aircraft, as well as frequencies to be used, and so on. It is a set of measures that would allow to operate more efficiently and understand maneuvers of each other when such encounters take place.

- Earlier, Poland suggested modernizing the OSCE Vienna Document by precising the rules for preventing collisions at sea and in the air. How effective can this initiative be?
AG: The fundamental problem is that no cosmetic improvments of confidence-building measures can fundamentally change negative tendencies in the sphere of military security. Only if NATO refused its current policy and military build-up in the spirit of the Cold War deterrence, the situation could dramatically improve, and  pre-conditions would emerge to start talking about confidence-building measures. NATO moves its infrastructure closer to our borders, steps up its military activity, exercises destabilizing military moves, and at the same time claims some confidence-building measures are necessary. It turns out that NATO simply seeks to legitimize its increased activity by these confidence-building measures. From the history of arms control, we know that progress was possible only if we shared a common vision of the principles pn which we build the European security. For many years until recently the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) on the commitments not to deploy additional substantial combat forces on a permanent basis on the territory of new NATO members, were one of the pillars for providing security in Central Europe not by building up military capabilities but, on the contrary, through military restraint and minimization of the military factor in relations between the countries of the region. Today, NATO follows the opposite direction by increasing its military capabilities. This is a road to nowhere, and no cosmetic measures such as improvement of the Vienna Document will change the picture.

- Given that we now live in a different environment, is it necessary to adjust if the Founding Act?
AG: We suggested that. In particular, the provision I've mentioned (about substantial combat forces) which is rather vague. Earlier, Russia introduced specific proposals, expressed in quantitative terms for main categories of arms, about what we mean by "substantial combat forces". NATO did not respond.